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Introduction   
 
Some developing countries have experienced rapid economic growth, some slow 
economic growth, some no growth at all, and some economic decline.1 The traditional 
way of gauging the distributional consequences of economic growth, if in fact there was 
economic growth, is to use data from comparable cross sections to calculate various 
measures of (relative) inequality and (absolute) poverty. The very large literature on 
inequality and poverty will not be reviewed here.2
 
A newer approach in the development literature is to study the distributional 
consequences of economic growth (or non-growth) by using data for the same recipient 
units for two or more points in time to analyze changes in total income (“income 
mobility”) and in income from paid employment and self-employment (“earnings 
mobility”). Such data, called panel data or longitudinal data,  may involve baseline 
interviews and one or more subsequent reinterviews or alternatively a single interview 
with retrospective questions about previous income or earnings. Examples of panels with 
reinterviews are South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study, the Indonesia 
Family Life Study, and Chile’s CASEN panel. A prominent panel based on retrospective 
data is the China Household Income Project. The literature reviewed in this paper draws 
on both kinds of panel data. 
 
                                                 
1 Growth rates are available, for example, in Table 1 of every World Bank World Development Report. 
 
2 Two excellent resources on poverty and inequality are http://www.worldbank.org/poverty and 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. 
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This paper reviews the previous empirical literature on the following questions for low- 
and middle-income countries:  
• How much earnings mobility is there? 
• To what extent do the mobility patterns in countries approximate complete 
persistence or perfect mobility? 
• Is there evidence of cumulative advantage and poverty traps? 
• Who benefits the most from the growth process, and how much do they 
benefit? Who is left behind or made more vulnerable? 
• Who is hurt when economic decline takes place and by how much (and who 
can withstand or even see income gains in such environments)? 
• What are the forces behind these changes and behind the experiences of 
different groups of individuals? 
The review does not cover Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Albania, for which new results 
are presented elsewhere. 
 
I report the highlights and do not try to find and cite all of the studies of developing 
countries’ income and earnings mobility. The review excludes studies that use pseudo-
panels and those that use data from one or a very small number of villages, cities, or 
occupational groups. 3, 4  
 
Before proceeding, it bears mention that two methodological issues pervade the literature: 
measurement error and attrition bias. In the great majority of cases, the available data do 
not permit the analyst to address these issues. Accordingly, the reader is cautioned to 
interpret the evidence presented with a certain degree of caution. 
 
The first lesson coming out of studies of economic growth and earnings mobility is that 
not everybody gains when economic growth takes place and not everybody loses when 
economic decline takes place. Figures 1 and 2 on the next pages display the distribution 
of earnings changes during Tanzania’s 2004-2006 economic growth and Argentina’s 
2001-2002 economic crisis. We see that the majority of earnings changes were to the 
right (left) of the zero point, but a sizeable number were positive (negative). Similarly, in 
a study of income changes during a time of sharp economic decline in Côte d’Ivoire, it 
was found that about 30% of households moved up from “extreme poor” to “mid-poor” 
or from “mid-poor” to “non-poor.” In the words of the study’s authors (Grootaert and 
Kanbur, 1996), “the general message is loud and clear: the lucky ‘few’ were not so few!” 
(Exclamation point in the original.) 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Pseudo-panel studies are those that use cross sectional data to look at similar people but not the same individuals – for 
example, those of a particular gender and education level who are in a certain age group in the initial year and who are t 
years older t years later. Examples are the studies by Antman and McKenzie (2007) for Mexico, Navarro (2006) for 
Argentina, and Calónico (2006) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
4 Examples of mobility studies based on limited geographic coverage are the studies of single villages such as Palanpur, 
India (Drèze, Lanjouw, and Stern, 1992) and single cities such as Lima, Peru (Glewwe and Hall, 1998). 
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Figure 1 
Tanzania: 
Distribution of Earnings Changes, 2004-2006 
 
 
Figure 2 
Argentina: 
Distribution of Earnings Changes Between -1000 and +1000 Pesos, 2001-2002 
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Source: Fields and Sánchez Puerta (2010). 
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Macro Mobility and Earnings Dynamics 
 
The literature distinguishes different possible mobility patterns: zero mobility, complete 
mobility, low earnings traps, and cumulative advantage. We might ask: as an empirical 
matter, which if any of these is an accurate characterization of earnings mobility in 
developing countries? Information is presented in what follows for six countries: 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, China, South Africa, and Ethiopia. 5
 
Starting with Argentina, in a country at that level of economic development, the majority 
of workers are wage and salaried employees, and so it is possible to examine changes in 
individual earnings for the majority of workers in the Argentine labor force. Table 1 
displays a quintile transition matrix – that is, for workers who started in each of the five 
base-year quintiles, what proportion were in which quintile at a later point in time. The 
data show that 52.1% of workers changed earnings quintiles between 2001 and 2002, 
with more than half of those who started in the lowest earnings quintile moving up to a 
higher quintile and about one-third of those who started in the highest earnings quintile 
moving down to a lower quintile. 6  
 
 
Table 1 
Urban Argentina: Earnings Quintile Transition Matrix, 2001-2002. 
 
 Quintile in 2002  
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total 
Quintile 
in 2001 
      
Quintile 1 48.7% 25.9% 12.0% 6.1% 7.3% 100% 
Quintile 2 22.7 37.8 32.8 5.9 0.7 100% 
Quintile 3 16.2 9.1 41.3 28.4 5.0 100% 
Quintile 4 14.5 2.9 13.0 47.8 21.9 100% 
Quintile 5 13.5 1.7 4.7 12.6 67.6 100% 
Source: Fields and Sánchez Puerta (2010). 
 
Table 2 displays a quintile transition matrix for urban China. The income variable used is 
total income, of which the great majority is labor earnings. The period in question, 1990-
1995, was a time of rapid economic growth. As in Argentina, and indeed as in many 
other countries, the cell with the greatest persistence is the 5-5 cell – that is, those who 
started in the richest income quintile were most likely to remain in that quintile compared 
                                                 
5 Many mobility studies present macro mobility results only. Examples are the studies by Wodon (2001) for Argentina 
and Mexico and by Nee (1994) and Wang (2005) for China. 
 
6 What can also be discerned in the data for Argentina is that sizeable percentages of workers in all quintiles in 2001 
ended up in the lowest-earnings quintile in 2002. This is not at all typical of what one usually finds.  It reflects the large 
movements of workers into unemployment and very low earnings caused by the more than 13% drop in real GDP 
between 2001 and 2002.  
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with those who started in any other income quintile. And, as is also typical, the cell with 
the second greatest persistence is the 1-1 cell – that is, those who started in the lowest 
income quintile were the next most likely to remain in the same quintile.  
 
Table 2 
Urban China: Income Quintile Transition Matrix, 1990-1995. 
 
 Quintile in 1995  
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total 
Quintile 
in 1990 
      
Quintile 1 43.9% 21.9%  17.7% 11.5% 4.9% 100% 
Quintile 2 27.7 26.0 20.3 16.1 9.9 100% 
Quintile 3 18.7 24.2 22.7 20.8 13.6 100% 
Quintile 4 7.6 20.6 24.9 24.9 22.0 100% 
Quintile 5 2.1 7.3 14.4 26.6 49.6 100% 
Source: Khor and Pencavel (2006). 
 
What do transition matrices such as these tell us about complete persistence and perfect 
mobility in reality? If earnings in Argentina and China had been completely persistent, all 
workers would have remained in the same earnings quintile. The Argentine and Chinese 
realities are very far from that characterization. On the other hand, if earnings had been 
perfectly mobile, 20% of those who started in a given quintile would have ended up in 
each of the five final-year quintiles. The Argentine and Chinese realities are very far from 
that characterization as well. Argentina and China typify what is found in such transition 
matrices: countries are roughly half-way between complete persistence and perfect 
mobility.  
 
The extent of earnings mobility can be viewed in another way: by following a smaller 
number of individuals through the earnings distribution over time. For Mexico, we 
selected those individuals at the fifth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, seventy-fifth, and ninety-fifth 
percentile of each of the five earnings quintiles in the base year (1998) and followed them 
to the next year (1999). (In Mexico, the 1998-1999 period was one of economic growth 
and rising inequality.)  The results are displayed in Figure 3. We see several things: i) 
The initially-high earners tended to remain high earners. ii) The earnings changes among 
high earners were quite disparate. iii) The low earners tended to remain low earners. iv) 
Many crossings took place within the middle of the earnings distribution. 
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Figure 3 
Mexico: Initial and Final Earnings for Twenty-Five Individuals 
1988
1989
0 10000 20000 30000
 
Source: Duval-Hernandez, Fields, and Sanchez-Puerta (2008). 
 
Another way of looking at earnings mobility is by drawing a low-earnings line and 
looking at transitions and non-transitions for earners who started above and below that 
line. Table 3 displays such a transition matrix for South Africa, where now the four cells 
of the matrix sum to 100%. What we see when just two categories are used (low earnings 
and not low earnings) is that the great majority of those who started below the low 
earnings line, 549 out of the original 678 (81%), were still observed to be below the low 
earnings line five years later. Conversely, 128 of the 205 who started above the low 
earnings line (62%) were still above the low earnings line five years later. South Africa 
too is far from either complete persistence or perfect mobility. South Africa exhibits a 
low earnings tendency but not a low earnings trap. 
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Table 3 
South Africa: Low Earner Transition Matrix, 1993-1998 
  Category in 1998  
Category in 1993 Below low earnings 
line 
Above low earnings 
line 
Total 
Below low earnings 
line 
549 
(62.2%) 
129 
(14.6%) 
678 
(76.8%) 
Above low earnings 
line 
77 
(8.7%) 
128 
(14.5%) 
205 
(23.2%) 
Total 626 
(100%) 
257 
(29.1%) 
883 
(100%) 
Source: Cichello et al. (2005). 
 
Consider this evidence in light of the hypothesis of cumulative advantage. In Argentina, 
China, Mexico, and South Africa, those individuals or households who start out 
advantaged are disproportionately likely to be advantaged later. Here too, success later in 
life is not guaranteed to the initially advantaged, but the initially advantaged have a much 
higher likelihood of being advantaged than do the initially disadvantaged. 
 
Before closing this section, it bears mention that in addition to the literature on changes in 
individual labor earnings which so far has been considered here, there is also a large 
literature on changes in household poverty. Poverty is gauged by comparing the total 
consumption or income of the household to a poverty line befitting their household size 
and composition. There is a large empirical literature on poverty traps in developing 
countries.7  To give a flavor of what this literature shows,  look at Tables 4 and 5, which 
present a poverty transition matrix for one of the richest developing countries, Chile, and 
one of the poorest, rural Ethiopia.  
 
In Chile, poverty is classified according to per capita autonomous income of the 
household. More households who started poor were found to be non-poor than poor after 
five years. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of households who started non-
poor remained so. The poor in Chile are not trapped; what Chile has is a poverty 
tendency. 
                                                 
7 The poverty dynamics literature is reviewed in Baulch and Hoddinott (2000), Hulme (2003), Dercon and Shapiro 
(2007), and Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2008). 
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Table.4 
Chile: Poverty Transition Matrix, 1996-2001 
 
  Category in 2001  
Category in 1996 Poor Non-poor That row as % of 
total 
Poor 43.6% 54.4% 20.2% 
Non-poor 11.4% 88.6% 79.8% 
That column as % 
of total 
 
18.5% 
 
81.7% 
 
100% 
Source: Neilson et al. (2008). 
 
Turning now to Ethiopia, poverty is defined according to a low-consumption line for a 
household. In just one year, the number of changes would not be expected to be great, but 
still there are significant transitions. Of households that started poor, more than one-third 
were not classified as poor one year later (though in the context of an economy as poor as 
Ethiopia’s, many of the non-poor are not living well). On the other side, more than one-
quarter of the households that started non-poor were classified as poor one year later. 
These drops into poverty highlight the vulnerability of the great mass of Ethiopia’s 
population. 8
 
 
Table 5 
Rural Ethiopia: Poverty Transition Matrix, 1994-1995 
 
  Category in 1995  
Category in 1994 Poor Non-poor Total 
Poor 24.8% 13.7%  
Non-poor 16.4% 45.1%  
   100% 
Source: Dercon and Krishnan (2000). 
 
In summary, the mobility literature reveals three patterns. First, the truth is in between 
complete persistence and perfect mobility; neither extreme is close to being correct. 
Second, a tendency is found for individuals who start as low earners and those 
households who start in poverty to remain so; however, low earnings and poverty are 
tendencies, not traps. And third, cumulative advantage is a tendency, not a certainty; 
starting in a favored position raises the likelihood of being in a favored position at a later 
time, but it does not guarantee it.  
 
 
                                                 
8 When the panel contains three or more interviews, the persistence of poverty and non-poverty can be examined. See 
Dercon and Shapiro (2007, Table 3.1) for such evidence from a number of developing countries. 
 
 9
Different Types of Micro Mobility Analysis 
 
As noted above, micro mobility studies start by asking who has more economic mobility 
and who has less. Let Y1 denote the reported value of the economic variable of interest in 
the initial year and let Y2 denote the reported value of the economic variable of interest in 
the final year. Define “economic mobility” for income recipient i as 1,2,, iiti YYY −≡Δ . 
Throughout the micro mobility literature, the dependent variable is invariably the change 
in the reported value of Y. 
 
The economic variable of interest can be change in total income (“income mobility”), 
change in income from the labor market (“earnings mobility”), or change in some other 
economic variable such as wealth. The recipient units can be individuals or households. 
In studies of household income mobility, household income is typically adjusted for 
household size, either on a per capita basis or using equivalence scales.  The recipient 
units’ changes can be measured as change in income in real currency units, change in log-
income (real), or change in position (in quintiles, deciles, or centiles) within the income, 
earnings, or wealth distribution. The focus here will be on earnings change in real 
currency units, but studies of change in; total income will also be cited where relevant. 
 
It is useful to separate out two types of micro mobility studies. Both examine such 
correlates of earnings change as initial earnings, gender, education, and geographic 
location. Unconditional micro mobility studies examine these correlates one variable at a 
time – for example, to determine who has more economic mobility, men or women or 
better-educated vs. less-educated workers. The purpose of these studies is explicitly not 
to hold other things equal; their purpose is to see who is doing better, period. On the other 
hand, conditional micro mobility studies gauge the effect of one correlate controlling for 
the role of others – for example, to determine whether men have more economic mobility 
than women after controlling for gender differences in education, geographic location, 
etc. Both sets of issues – identifying which are the important unconditional correlates of 
economic mobility and which are the important conditional correlates – are of interest 
and are taken up in turn in the following sections. 
 
 
Unconditional Micro Mobility 
 
In studies of unconditional earnings mobility (and other types of economic mobility as 
well), considerable attention has been paid to the question of how earnings changes relate 
to initial earnings. As above, letting Y1 and Y2 denote initial reported earnings and final 
reported earnings respectively and 12, YYY ti −≡Δ denote the change in reported earnings 
from initial to final year, unconditional mobility studies typically run linear regressions of 
the form 
titiiiti YYYY ,1,1,2,, εβα ++=−≡Δ − ,                                               (1) 
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although non-parametric regressions have occasionally been estimated as well. The error 
term in (1) is usually assumed to be independent and identically distributed. This 
assumption is far from innocuous.9
 
Various theories have been brought to bear on the expected sign of β in these models.10 
The theory of cumulative advantage maintains that for a variety of economic and political 
reasons, those who have the most to begin with are the ones likely to continue to gain 
advantage. Then there is the notion of poverty traps, according to which those who start 
out in poverty are likely to face serious disadvantages that make it hard for them to move 
up and out of poverty. A third factor is the phenomenon of labor market twist. This is the 
idea that due to skill-biased technological change in today’s globalized world, the relative 
demand for skilled labor has outpaced the relative demand for unskilled labor, resulting 
in larger earnings gains for the skilled (who on average are high earners) than for the 
unskilled (who on average earn less). These three factors – cumulative advantage, 
poverty traps, and labor market twist – create an expectation that those households and 
individuals who experience the earnings gains over time will be the highest initial 
earners. On the other hand, the theory of regression to the grand mean leads one to 
expect that those with initially high earnings will do less well than those with initially 
low earnings.11
 
Empirically, the studies of developing countries to date (reviewed below) produce a 
virtual consensus: unconditionally, with one major exception, those who gained the most 
over time have generally been those who reported the lowest incomes or earnings to 
begin with. This result is termed “unconditional convergence.”  
 
Unconditional convergence comes in two flavors. The weaker form of unconditional 
convergence is that the largest percentage changes in income or earnings are experienced 
by those who have the lowest reported incomes or earnings to begin with. Such “weak 
unconditional convergence” has been reported in studies of income mobility in Indonesia, 
South Africa, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2003a), in Tanzania (Quinn and Teal, 2008) 
and in China for the period 1991-1995 (Ying, Li, and Deng, 2006; Khor and Pencavel, 
2006), of consumption mobility in Peru (Grimm, 2007), and of earnings mobility in 
South Africa (Cichello, et al., 2005). In China, though, a reversal is reported: whereas 
weak unconditional convergence appeared in the data for 1991-1995, weak unconditional 
divergence appeared for the period 1998-2002 (Ying, Li, and Deng, 2006). Why this 
reversal took place is clearly an important question for future work. 
 
                                                 
9 An important task yet to be carried out in the income and earnings mobility literature is to work out the full implications of a non-iid 
structure for εit in (1). 
 
10 Citations to these theories appear in Fields et al. (2007). 
 
11 The theory of regression to the grand mean goes back more than a century to Galton, who formulated the theory in the context of 
body heights. Galton’s ideas were put into an economic context by Zimmerman (1992) and Solon (1992). Following on this line of 
reasoning, it might be expected that those who have the highest incomes or earnings to start with would be the ones who are observed 
to gain the least when growth is positive and lose the most when growth is negative.  
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In addition to this finding about weak unconditional convergence, the literature offers an 
even stronger and perhaps surprising finding: that those with the lowest reported incomes 
or earnings to begin with have experienced the most positive or least negative changes in 
dollars. “Strong unconditional convergence” has appeared in studies of income mobility 
in Indonesia, South Africa, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2003a) and of earnings mobility 
in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007) and South Africa (Cichello et 
al., 2005). 
 
The results of the unconditional convergence studies just cited have not been accepted 
unquestioningly for good reason: the possible mismeasurement of income or earnings. In 
regressions of the type 
titiiiti YYYY ,1,1,2,, εβα ++=−≡Δ − ,                                               (1) 
if Y1 is measured with error, the mismeasured variable appears both on the left hand side 
and on the right hand side of the regression, producing an attenuation bias which in this 
context means that apparent convergent mobility can be spurious rather than real.12 A 
direct way of remedying the measurement error in survey data is to instead use 
administrative data such as employers’ reports to the tax authorities. Such a study has 
been conducted for the United States; Dragoset and Fields (2008) find unconditional 
convergence using both survey data and administrative data for the exact same 
respondents. I know of no data set that can be used to conduct such a study for a 
developing country. 
 
In developing countries, where administrative data are lacking, analysts have tried to 
address the measurement error issue by replacing Y1 on the right hand side of (1) by a 
measure of predicted or longer term income or earnings, . When regressions of the type 1ˆY
titiiiti YYYY ,1,1,2., ˆ εβα ++=−≡Δ −                                                (2) 
have been run, the results prove to be quite mixed. In the study of income mobility in 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2003a), unconditional convergence 
was still found in South Africa, but unconditional divergence was found in Indonesia and 
no statistically significant pattern appeared in Venezuela.  Each of these regressions was 
run for a single year only. Later, in a study of earnings mobility in Argentina, Mexico, 
and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007), such regressions were run for many years in each 
country. In Argentina, the estimates of (2) produced convergent results in most years and 
insignificant results in others. In Mexico, the results were overwhelmingly insignificant. 
In Venezuela, the results were significantly convergent in two years, insignificant in two 
years, and significantly divergent in two years.  
 
Note well what statistical insignificance means in the context of equation (2): the income 
or earnings changes in currency units were not significantly different for those in 
different parts of the income or earnings distribution. This may come as a surprise to 
those who infer from slowly-changing Lorenz curves and other measures of relative 
                                                 
12 Whenever the right-hand-side variable is measured with error in a regression, an attenuation bias results (Deaton, 
1997). However, the presence of the same mismeasured Y1 variable as a regressor on the right-hand-side and in Y2 – Y1 
on the left-hand-side produces a further attenuation bias. See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for details. 
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inequality that in times of economic growth those who gain the most dollars are those at 
the top of the income or earnings distribution.  
 
Convergent mobility ties in with one aspect of macro mobility, namely, whether the 
mobility that takes place equalizes longer-term earnings relative to initial earnings 
(Fields, 2010). The idea that longer-term earnings are more equally distributed than 
earnings in any given year is an old one. For example, Milton Friedman (1962) wrote: 
Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual income.  
In one there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular 
families in the income hierarchy varies widely from year to year.  In the 
other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same position 
year after year.  Clearly, in any meaningful sense, the second would be the 
more unequal society. 
 
In a similar vein, Paul Krugman (1992) stated: "If income mobility were very high, the 
degree of inequality in any given year would be unimportant, because the distribution of 
lifetime income would be very even . . . An increase in income mobility tends to make 
the distribution of lifetime income more equal." The empirical studies that have 
investigated this issue for developing countries all confirm that mobility does in fact 
equalize longer-term incomes; see Wang (2005) on China and Duval Hernández, Fields, 
and Sánchez Puerta (2008) on Argentina and Mexico.13  
 
Some micro mobility studies have investigated the relationship between income or 
earnings change on the one hand and variables other than initial income or earnings on 
the other. Of particular interest to this project is change in labor market status (whether 
employed or unemployed) and change in type of work performed (for example, formal or 
informal) or type of employment relationship (employer, wage employee, self-employed 
or household worker). 
 
Numerous changes between labor market states are reported in various countries - among 
them, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania (Sandefur, Serneels, and Teal, 2006; Bigsten, 
Mengistae, and Shimeles, 2007) and Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2004; Maloney, 2004; Duryea et al., 2006; Beccaria and Groisman, 
2007; Pagés and Stampini, 2007). It would be expected that changes in whether a person 
is employed and in the type of employment would be linked to changing income and 
earnings. Indeed, research findings bear this out. Households whose heads gained 
employment or (where available) gained formal sector employment were the ones that 
exhibited the largest per capita income gains in Indonesia, South Africa, and Venezuela 
(Fields et al., 2003b). In Korea, the loss of employment was a major factor producing 
downward income mobility during that country’s financial crisis of the late 1990s (Yoo, 
2004). In Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, workers who moved from formal wage 
employment to informal wage employment on average experienced a decline in monthly 
                                                 
13 It is worth noting that in the United States, earnings mobility equalized longer-term earnings relative to initial in the 
1970s but disequalized longer-term earnings relative to initial in the 1980s (Fields, 2010), while in France earnings 
mobility always equalized longer-term earnings relative to initial (Buchinsky et al., 2003). 
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earnings, while the reverse move produced the reverse earnings change on average 
(Duryea et al, 2006). In South Africa, although earnings mobility is strongly influenced 
by sector change, research has shown that it is not necessary to acquire a formal sector 
job in order to achieve earnings gains; indeed, the majority of those who achieved 
earnings gains in South Africa did so within the sector where they were employed 
(Cichello et al., 2005). Despite what is known, it remains to examine more systematically 
the changes in earnings for those who make various labor market transitions (for 
example, between wage employment, household enterprises, and self employment; 
between formal and informal employment; between major economic sectors such as 
agriculture, industry, and services) as well as the changes in earnings for those who do 
not make such transitions.14
 
Another variable that has been explored is non-economic shocks. For example, it was 
found in Pakistan that low-income rural households suffered more from natural disasters 
than more privileged households did (Villanger, 2003). On the other hand, in Indonesia, 
neither positive shocks nor negative shocks disproportionately affected poor households 
(Newhouse, 2005). As for man-made disasters, a study in Rwanda showed that 
households experiencing the murder or imprisonment of one of their members moved 
considerably downward in the income distribution (Verpoorten and Berlage, 2007). 
 
What is striking is that many of the variables which have been shown to be important in 
determining earnings levels turn out to be remarkably unimportant in explaining earnings 
changes. For example, education is a key determinant of earnings levels all over the 
world (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). And yet education explains only 1.5% of 
earnings change in Indonesia, 0.6% in South Africa, and 0.1% in Venezuela (Fields et al, 
2003b). An explanatory variable can be said to be unimportant if it is either statistically 
insignificant or economically insignificant. (A variable is termed “economically 
insignificant” in the unconditional context if a simple regression of income or earnings 
change on that variable produces an R2 less than 1%.) In the study of Indonesia, South 
Africa, and Venezuela, variables that were shown to be unimportant included gender of 
the head of the household (insignificant in all 3), education of the head of the household 
(insignificant in 2), age of the head of the household (insignificant in all 3), and 
geographic region (insignificant in 2).  Similarly, in a study of Tanzania, education and 
age were statistically insignificant determinants of earnings growth (Quinn and Teal, 
2008). 
 
Another question examined in the literature is the symmetry of mobility hypothesis. This 
is the idea that those groups that experience the largest earnings gain in dollars when the 
economy is growing are those that experience the largest earnings losses in dollars when 
                                                 
14 It is obvious that those who started unemployed and became employed necessarily experienced earnings gains, and 
likewise those who became unemployed necessarily experienced earnings losses. What is not obvious is that the people 
who transitioned into or out of unemployment are a small minority. For example, in Argentina, which suffered a real 
GDP decline of 13.5% between 2001 and 2002 and a large increase in unemployment, 89% of the individuals who 
were employed in 2001 were also employed in 2002. When the analysis is limited only to the individuals who were 
employed in both years, it remains the case that sector of employment is the second most important factor (after initial 
reported earnings) in explaining earnings changes. See Fields and Sánchez Puerta (2005) for details. 
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the economy is contracting. Using the multiple panels available in Argentina, Mexico, 
and Venezuela, Fields et al. (2007) tested this hypothesis comparing positive growth and 
negative growth years for six variables: initial reported earnings quintile, gender, age, 
education, sector transition, and geographic region. Only for gender in Venezuela was it 
the case that the group that gained the most in times of growth (men) did worst in times 
of economic decline. For the other variables in Venezuela and for all the variables in 
Argentina and Mexico, when statistically significant differences between groups were 
found, the same groups that experienced the most positive earnings changes when the 
economy was growing also did best when the economy was contracting. In sum, 
symmetry of mobility does not hold generally, at least in studies so far. 
 
Finally, some unconditional micro mobility studies have used positional change rather 
than earnings change as the dependent variable. Examples are studies of Malaysia 
(Trczinski and Randolph, 1991) and China (Zhang, Huang, and Mi, 2006). The Malaysia 
study reached an interesting conclusion: “Only one action enhanced an individual’s 
prospect for relative mobility. By actively searching out new jobs in response to changing 
economic circumstances, an individual could increase the prospects for upward 
mobility.” 
 
 
Conditional Micro Mobility 
 
Turning now to studies of conditional micro mobility, these studies run descriptive 
multiple regressions of the form  
tititiititi XXZYY ,,41,321,1, εββββα +++++=Δ −−                                                (3) 
or  
tititiititi XXZYY ,,41,321,1, ''''''log εββββα +++++=Δ −− . 15                               
(3') 
In (3), the dependent variable is the same as it was in (1) and (2): the change in 
income or earnings in dollars between the initial year t-1 and final year t. On the right 
hand side, denotes the income or earnings reported in the initial year,  denotes 
time-invariant individual characteristics like age, gender, race, and education, and 
denote time-varying individual characteristics like occupation and sector of 
employment in years t-1 and t respectively. The estimate of coefficient
tiY ,Δ
1, −tiY iZ
1, −tiX
tiX ,
1β  in (3) is used to 
determine whether mobility is strongly conditionally convergent. If 01 <β  , there is 
strong conditional convergence; if 01 >β , there is strong conditional divergence; and 
if 01 =β or is not significantly different from zero, the pattern of earnings change is 
neutral with respect to initial earnings, i.e., recipients in different parts of the initial 
earnings distribution gain the same amount in dollars (and hence those who report low 
initial earnings gain more in percentage terms than those with higher reported initial 
earnings). Researchers have also used change in log Y as the dependent variable as in (3'), 
                                                 
15 “Descriptive regression” means that the regression coefficients do not necessarily have a causal interpretation. 
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in which case the regression coefficients measure changes in percentages rather than in 
dollars and the resultant 1β ' provides a test of weak conditional convergence. 
 
Looking first at the 1β and '1β coefficients in (3) and (3'), the overwhelming pattern in the 
literature is that they are negative. and thus, incomes and earnings converge to their 
conditional mean. When reported initial incomes and earnings have been used, strong 
conditional convergence has been found for income mobility in India (Coondoo and 
Dutta, 1990), Côte d'Ivoire (Grootaert, Kanbur, and Oh, (1997), Indonesia, South Africa, 
and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2003b) and for earnings mobility in South Africa (Cichello 
et al., 2005), Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007). Some studies tested 
only for weak conditional convergence, which was found for income mobility in Chile 
(Scott and Litchfield, 1994) and South Africa (Woolard and Klasen, 2005). Finally, when 
predicted incomes were used instead of reported incomes, weak conditional convergence 
was found in Indonesia and South Africa but not Venezuela, but strong conditional 
convergence was not found in any of the three. 
 
Switching our attention from initial income or earnings to the time-invariant variables (Z) 
and the time-varying variables (X) in (3) and (3'), the literature reveals that other 
variables also play a role in explaining changes in income or earnings:  
• The conditional effect of education was found to be statistically significant and 
positive in Peru (Herrera, 1999), South Africa (Cichello et al., 2005), Argentina, 
Mexico, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007).  
• The conditional effect of gender (being male) was found to be statistically 
significantly positive in South Africa (Cichello et al., 2005), Argentina, Mexico, 
and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007). On the other hand, another study of Argentina 
found a statistically significant negative effect of being male (McKenzie, 2004). 
• The conditional effects of sector transitions were statistically significant in South 
Africa (Cichello et al., 2005; Woolard and Klasen, 2005) and Argentina, Mexico, 
and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007). 
• The conditional effect of geographic region was found to be statistically 
significant in Côte d’Ivoire (Grootaert, Kanbur, and Oh, 1997) but insignificant in 
Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela (Fields et al., 2007). 
 
Among the statistically significant variables, not all are economically significant. In the 
conditional mobility context, a variable may be judged to be conditionally unimportant if 
either a) it is statistically insignificant or b) the decomposition weight on that variable is 
less than 1%.16  In Indonesia, South Africa, and Venezuela, variables that were shown to 
be conditionally unimportant in explaining income mobility were the same ones that were 
unimportant unconditionally: gender of the head of the household, education of the head 
of the household, age of the head of the household, and geographic region (Fields et al, 
2003b). 
 
                                                 
16 The decomposition weights come from a method devised by Fields (2003). 
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Relevance for Policy 
 
The empirical findings presented in this paper offer some guidance on which policy 
options merit further consideration and which ones do not. Among the alternative policy 
interventions are: creating more good jobs, raising earnings and productivity in the bad 
jobs sector, raising individuals’ skills through education and training, providing credit, 
creating fallback jobs for those who want and need them, and improving labor market 
information systems. 
 
Let us take as given that the objective of policy is to reduce low earnings in the labor 
market to the maximum extent possible. When would each of these six policy 
interventions be a compelling policy priority, and alternatively, when would each of these 
policy interventions not be a compelling policy priority? Empirical research offers 
guidance to the policy-maker. 
 
Suppose a country exhibits close-to-perfect mobility. Then in the normal course of things, 
economic mobility could be counted on to raise a lot of low earners up, but also push a 
lot of high earners down. What would not be helpful in such a setting would be such 
interventions as training and credit; these would not be helpful in a very high mobility 
setting, because some workers would be low earners because of the bad luck of the draw 
this time, but they would get a new draw next time. What would be a policy priority if 
mobility were close-to-perfect would be the creation of more good jobs, because such a 
policy would raise the expected earnings of everyone over a number of periods. The 
further a country is from perfect mobility, the less obvious it is that the creation of good 
jobs is more important than other labor market policy interventions. 
 
Suppose instead that a country has close-to-zero mobility. Then, if the labor market were 
simply left alone, many individuals would be trapped in low-earnings situations with no 
hope at all of escaping while many others would be in a very sticky situation from which 
some could escape but most could not. Clearly, some intervention would be called for, 
but which one? What would get some of these people out of low earnings? The answer 
depends in large part on what it is that is keeping their earnings low. If the low earners 
cannot possibly do better in the sectors where they are now, then consideration should be 
given to how to get them out of where they are now. Expanding job opportunities in the 
good jobs part of the economy would be helpful in such a circumstance. On the other 
hand, there may well be scope for raising low earnings in the poorer sectors of the labor 
market by relaxing the constraints that now consign low earners to a life of economic 
misery. Among the policy actions that might do this are providing workers in the bad jobs 
sectors with more to work with, raising individuals’ skills through education and training, 
providing credit and business know-how to raise their self-employment earnings, and 
making available fallback jobs so that when all else fails, the low-earners have someplace 
to turn in order to be able to earn something in the course of a day, a week, or a month. 
 
Can policy ever be influenced by mobility research? An example of where research had a 
direct policy impact occurred in South Africa, on which the author has worked. A high 
official in the National Treasury told us that he believed that the only way to get ahead in 
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the South African labor market is to acquire a formal sector job. (In the South African 
context, a formal sector job is one that is registered by the government and subject to all 
of the labor market protections provided under the law.) Mobility research that we 
conducted showed two quite different things. First, although some workers did indeed get 
ahead by moving from informal to formal jobs, the great majority of workers who got 
ahead did so within the sectors where they already were working. And second, the rate of 
increase in earnings in rand (the South African currency) was the same for the formal 
sector as for the informal sector. These findings showed the government that the informal 
sector was much more dynamic than they had previously thought, and so they responded 
to this mobility research in their next budget message by placing much more of emphasis 
on raising earnings within the informal sector than they had previously. 
 
On the other hand, based on our reading of the literature on developing countries’ labor 
markets, what seems to be appropriate rarely if ever would be efforts to improve labor 
market information systems. It is doubtless true that any given individual could have an 
improved chance of getting a better job if he or she had better labor market information. 
However, policy-makers need to be aware of the fallacy of composition: unless there are 
more jobs, anything that makes it more likely for Individual A to be hired makes it more 
likely for Individual B not to be hired. The existing research gives no indication that what 
is constraining upward mobility in the economy as a whole is lack of information on the 
part of employers as to where to find workers or lack of information on the part of 
workers as to where the wages and other job conditions are better. Rather, in developing 
countries, the major problem is a lack of good jobs for all the job-seekers who are 
available for such work and capable of performing it. Policy-makers should therefore be 
cautioned that labor market information systems are likely to produce minimal social 
benefits, perhaps at quite high social cost. 
 
In conclusion, mobility research may lead policy-makers to judge which certain policy 
interventions are likely to be beneficial in a given country context and which would not 
be. This is itself important information, but it is not enough. Policy-makers and those that 
advise them need to ask other questions. How large are the benefits from a given policy 
intervention likely to be? What are the direct costs of a given policy intervention under 
consideration? What are the opportunity costs? More cooperation between mobility 
analysts and public economists are likely to lead to better answers for policy-makers. 
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